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Theses
1.	 While the Russian Far East was not an important region in the Russian cen-
tral government’s internal policy during the 1990s, when Vladimir Putin 
assumed the presidency it was declared strategically significant. Intensified 
interest in the region became possible mainly as a result of the improvement 
of the economic situation in Russia, which was itself linked to the boom in 
prices on oil and gas markets. However, regardless of the numerous strate-
gies, concepts and programmes adopted, the Russian government over the 
past 25 years has been unable to develop a genuinely comprehensive model 
for the region’s development. 
2.	 Considering the concrete measures taken by the Russian government, en-
ergy and transport need to be recognised as the region’s most promising 
sectors. On the one hand, one direct consequence of the priorities signalled 
by the government will be that the state passes the burden of investing in the 
region to such strategic Russian companies as Rosneft, Gazprom and RZD 
(Russian Railways) which are engaged in the implementation of expensive 
infrastructural projects in the Russian Far East. On the other hand, this will 
result in a deepening reliance of the Russian and regional economies on the 
energy sector, which is increasingly sensitive to the changing situation on 
external markets. 
3.	 Moscow has been unable so far to generate tangible development impulses in 
the region, so the Russian Far East has not yet become – contrary to the goals 
set – an important instrument for strengthening Moscow’s economic influ-
ence in East Asia. The expectations that cross-border economic co-operation 
would intensify to an extent that could significantly improve the dynamics 
of regional development have not been fulfilled. The actual engagement of 
foreign capital, predominantly Chinese, is much lower than declared at the 
time of top-level diplomatic meetings. 
4.	 The main barriers to development are those linked to systemic problems ex-
isting in Russia as a whole, including above all the lack of a coherent concept 
of economic development and the ineffective governance system. Further-
more, the significant distance from the European part of the Russian Fed-
eration and the poorly developed transport routes adversely affect economic 
contacts between the Far East and other Russian regions. Nevertheless, 
many barriers have a specifically local character: staffing problems, the de-
centralised energy system and the limited engagement of foreign investors. 
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5.	 At present, there is no risk that the region will be as marginalised as it was 
in the 1990s. At the same time, there are no prerequisites that would per-
mit the assumption that the economy of the Russian Far East could become 
competitive in relation to the increasingly rapidly developing northern 
provinces of China or South Korea and Japan in the medium or long term. 
Therefore, it appears that political reintegration of the region with the cen-
tre, tighter institutional control of the region by Moscow and newly estab-
lished institutions, nominations for local officials and adopted strategies, 
and its status as a stable supply base of raw materials for Asian countries is, 
in the current circumstances, the maximum development potential of the 
Russian Far East. 
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InTroducTIon
The goal of this paper is, on the one hand, to analyse the evolution of the pro-
gramme conceived by the federal government for the development of the Rus-
sian Far East (in this paper, the term is equivalent to the territory of the Far 
Eastern Federal District, FEFD), and, on the other hand, to evaluate the specific 
actions taken by the government indicating the best-developed economic sec-
tors of the region and by identifying the systemic barriers hindering its devel-
opment. 
The statistical data provided in this paper concern, above all, the Far Eastern 
Federal District. However, in certain cases collective data covering the FEFD 
and the so-called Baikal Region, which is part of the Siberian Federal District, 
have been used (this is indicated clearly in the text). 
8O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
6/
20
17
I. The specIal characTerIsTIcs of The russIan far 
easT and The evoluTIon of The concepT for ITs 
developmenT 
The collapse of the USSR severely affected the residents of the Russian Far East 
and its economy where the mining and defence sectors and heavy industry pre-
dominated. The region, which for years had supplied raw materials and pro-
cessed products and yet had also benefited from significant subsidies from the 
federal budget, was forced to solve local problems by itself, which adversely 
affected its further development. The region’s economic ties with the remain-
ing part of Russia weakened. Trade with the rapidly developing neighbouring 
Asian countries began to grow at a faster rate than internal regional trade. This 
triggered increasing problems with ensuring social stability in the Russian Far 
East and with its cultural identity.
The situation changed after Vladimir Putin took power, especially in the previ-
ous years, when the Russian government announced a political and economic 
‘turn to the East’. Actions were taken to reconstruct and stimulate the region 
whose unique geographical location and significant otential (albeit partially 
untapped) in the areas of raw material supplies and defence gives it great geo-
political and economic importance. In his speech in December 2013, President 
Vladimir Putin announced that the development of Eastern Siberia and the Far 
East was the national priority in the 21st century, hoping that it would become 
a driving engine for Russian economic growth in the coming decades. The re-
gion, according to the Russian government’s assumptions, was intended to be-
come both a raw material base for the neighbouring Asian countries (above all 
China) and also an investment destination, which would contribute to its eco-
nomic revival. One confirmation of the Russian plans is provided by documents 
adopted over the past decade or so, such as the Strategy for Socio-Economic 
Development of the Far East and the Baikal Region to 2025 (2009) and the Trans-
port Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2030 (2014). In 2014, the government 
also approved the Concept for Socio-Economic Development of the Kuril Islands 
(Sakhalin Oblast) for 2016–2025. In 2012, the Ministry for Development of the 
Russian Far East was established, which initiates, coordinates and supervises 
the implementation of the programmes. 
1. General characteristics of the russian far east
The Russian Far East has an area of nearly 6.2 million km2, which is 36.1% of 
the area of the Russian Federation. In the present administrative division of 
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Russia into federal districts, the Far Eastern Federal District encompasses the 
Sakha Republic (Yakutia), the Primorsky, Khabarovsk and Kamchatka Krais, 
the Amur, Magadan and Sakhalin Oblasts (including the Kuril Islands), the Jew-
ish Autonomous Oblast and the Chukotka Autonomous Oblast. It has less than 
6.3 million residents (4.3% of Russia’s population), being one of the least densely 
populated territories of the Russian Federation. 
The region constitutes a relatively small share of the Russian economy in con-
trast to its resource and production potential. Productivity and volume of in-
novative production are below the Russian average. Capital investment levels 
and real household net disposable income of the population are also subpar. 
Over 90% of the investments are directed towards the oil and gas production 
sector. The Far Eastern Federal District is ranked last but one among all the 
Russian federal districts as regards the value of subsidies from the federal 
budget (see Table 1). 
The regions which represent the greatest share of Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) of the Russian Far East are: Sakhalin Oblast (22%), Primorsky Krai 
(20%), Yakutia (19%) and Khabarovsk Krai (18%). GRP in the remaining federal 
regions is below the Russian average (less than 40% of the Russian average 
in the Republic of Buryatia and less than 50% in Zabaykalsky Krai). Yakutia 
and Sakhalin Oblast are the two federal subjects responsible for over 50% of 
investments in the region. More than half of the macroregion’s export poten-
tial is generated by Sakhalin Oblast. Owing to its rapid development, Sakhalin 
Oblast has become the only federal subject in the Far East not to use subsidies 
from the federal budget.
Table 1. The level of budget investments from the federal budget to individual 
federal districts
2010–2015
2015/2010 
(in %)in billions 
of roubles
position among
 the federal districts
central 18,094.1 1 126.6
ural 12,417.1 2 121.7
volga 12,286.1 3 119.4
north-West 8,211.7 4 90.2
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2010–2015
2015/2010 
(in %)in billions 
of roubles
position among
 the federal districts
siberia 7,965.4 5 101.0
south 7,309.5 6 98.4
far east 5,358.2 7 83.7
north caucasus 2,511.9 8 121.4
Source: Экономическая конъюнктура в Дальневосточном федеральном округе в 2015 г., Про­
странственная экономика, № 2, 2016, page 129.
The collapse of the USSR severely affected the economic development of the re-
gion. Factories and enterprises which had lost subsidies and state orders began 
limiting production or winding up within the first five years after the collapse 
of the USSR. Output fell in practically all sectors of the economy. The produc-
tion level fell most of all in light industry (22 times), construction (9.6 times), 
chemicals (6.4 times), machine-building (6.2 times), forestry (4.5 times) and the 
metallurgical industry (2.8 times)1. The export share of machines and equip-
ment fell from 30% in the early 1990s to 2.3% in 2012. In turn, the export share of 
hydrocarbons, fuels, metals and unprocessed wood increased to 85–90%. Resi-
dents, especially young people, deprived of jobs and incomes, began emigrating 
on a massive scale, mainly to the central regions of Russia (the number of people 
employed in industry decreased by 64%).
Before the collapse of the USSR, the defence	sector	used to be the region’s key 
production area. 34 large machine-building factories operated in the Far East 
in the 1980s, selling their products mainly to the defence sector: aircraft and 
helicopters, submarines (including nuclear), warships, sea-to-sea and sea-to-
air missiles, radio contact equipment and many other devices. Shipyards and 
repair yards working for the needs of the defence sector were concentrated 
in the Amur Valley (the factories in Sretensk, Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, 
Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Nikolayevsk-on-Amur) and in Vladivostok. 
Ferrous (black) and non-ferrous (coloured) metallurgy (26%) of industrial pro-
duction, concentrated in Yakutia and Khabarovsk, Amur and Magadan Oblasts 
and in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, had the largest share of output of the 
1 А. В. Хорошавин, В. К. Заусаев, Дальний Восток России: как жить и хозяйствовать?, 
Khabarovsk 2012.
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Russian Far East towards the end of the 1980s. Irkutsk Oblast is the centre of 
non-ferrous metallurgy, where almost 40% of Russian aluminium is produced. 
In addition to this, gold, silver, diamonds and numerous ores and rare-earth 
elements are mined and processed there. The macroregion also extracts oil (4% 
of Russia’s output) and natural gas (over 4%), diamonds (95% of Russia’s output: 
Yakutia), gold (2/3 of Russia’s output: Yakutia, Magadan Oblast and Chukotka 
Autonomous Oblast), coal (hard, brown and coking), silver, platinum, zinc and 
lead (Khabarovsk and Primorsky Krais), tin, tungsten and other resources.
As a result of the so called ‘voucher privatisation’ in the 1990s, the state-owned 
property was taken over by local elites and in many cases by local criminal 
groups. The	timber	industry and fishing were among the sectors which turned 
into a ‘grey economy’. Wood processing (boards, plywood, cardboard, paper), 
which used to have a 10% share in the Far East’s production, became unprofita-
ble without state subsidies, and tax revenues fell to one seventh of their previous 
levels. Many illegal sawmills emerged, employing unregistered migrants and 
exporting illegally obtained timber, mainly to China. The	situation	in	the	fish-
ing	industry,	where production used to flourish in the Soviet era owing to state 
subsidies, was similar. The fish caught was processed in fish processing plants 
or directly onboard of the trawlers and sold on the domestic market2. Most fish 
processing plants went bankrupt in the 1990s, and fish caught from privatised 
trawlers was supplied directly to Korean, Chinese and Japanese recipients. 
The region’s GRP figures, investment levels and residents’ real disposable mon-
ey income continued to decline. Agriculture and the food industry also found 
themselves mired in a deep slump in the absence of state subsidies. Imports 
from China and other Asian countries turned out to be cheaper than maintain-
ing and developing domestic agricultural production. 
The Far East also has significant mineral resources which are located in geologi-
cally difficult to access territories extending over various climate zones. Many 
of the deposits have not been developed as yet (for more information, see part II). 
The region is also rich in platinum (90% of Russia’s resources), diamonds (80%), 
nickel (79%), copper (79%), gold (75%), uranium (50%), iron ores (18%) and rare 
earth elements (25%) and many other mineral resources. 
2 Fish processing centres were concentrated in the Far Eastern seaports: Vladivostok, Na-
khodka, Korsakov, Nevelsk, Kholmsk, Yuzhno-Kurilsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. 
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Ample water	resources	are located in the Russian Far East and the part of East-
ern Siberia adjacent to it, which satisfy 13.5% of the country’s energy needs and 
are among the largest sources of potable water in Russia (Lake Baikal and the 
Lena and Amur rivers). The seas surrounding the region are rich in fish and sea 
products – the estimated resources are 26 million tonnes. Especially valuable 
resources are salmonids (around 450,000 tonnes are fished annually) and red 
caviar (16,000 – 17,000 tonnes annually). 
The region has 700	million	hectares	of	arable	land, only 1–1.5% of which is used 
in agriculture, mainly in the south. It also has rich forest resources, estimated 
at 90.5 million m3 (45% of Russia’s resources) which are relatively untapped. 
2. The russian far east: foreign trade
Foreign	trade	is	playing	an	increasingly	important	role	in	the	region’s	
economy,	and	its	potential	is	much	higher	than	that	of	trade	between	the	
eastern	regions	and	the	rest	of	Russia.	The Far Eastern regions which gener-
ally have the greatest share of inter-regional trade are: Sakhalin Oblast (43,9%) 
and Primorsky Krai (22%), and also Yakutia (18,7%) and Khabarovsk Krai (8%)3.
The key exports are: oil and gas (49.1%), fish products (12.6%), timber (4.9%) 
and metals (1.6%). The goods predominant in imports include machinery and 
means of transport (52.6%) and light industry products and foodstuffs. The 
Far East’s foreign trade volume in 2016 reached US$24.4 billion, which means 
that it fell by around 1/3 as compared to 2014. While trade volume was growing 
steadily between 2010 and 2014, from US$26.2 billion in 2010 to US$38.9 bil-
lion in 20144. 
As regards the share of individual federal subjects in the Far East’s foreign trade, 
Sakhalin Oblast, which accounts for 48% of the trade, is of key significance. The 
second most important key trade partner is Primorsky Krai (less than 30%). 
A detailed specification is provided in Table 2.
3 Data for 2016. 
4 Экономическая коньюнктура в Дальневосточном федеральном округе в 2014 г., 
Пространственная экономика, № 2, 2017, page 163. 
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Table 2. The share of individual regions in the Russian Far East’s foreign trade 
(in %)
2013 2014 2015 2016
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
amur oblast 1.6 3.9 2.3 1.3 3.8 2.0 2.0 2.9 2.5 1.8 2.9 2.1
Jewish autonomous 
oblast 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3
Kamchatka Krai 2.2 0.8 1.8 1.8 0.8 1.6 2.7 1.1 2.3 3.1 1.5 2.7
magadan oblast 1.1 3.8 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.4 2.1 0.8 1.8
primorsky Krai 11.9 70.4 29.4 13.9 71.8 29.5 13.3 62.9 23.9 11.7 55.1 22.0
Yakutia 16.8 1.4 12.2 17.7 0.7 13.1 18.3 3.2 14.9 24.0 1.7 18.7
sakhalin oblast 60.7 10 45.4 58.6 12.4 46.2 56.8 19.1 48.0 48.3 29.5 43.9
Khabarovsk Krai 5.4 7.6 6 5 7.6 5.7 5.6 8.1 6.1 8.3 7.2 8.0
chukotka 
autonomous oblast 0.3 1.4 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.6
Source: Экономическая конъюнктура в Дальневосточном федеральном округе в 2015 г., Прост­
ранственная экономика, № 3, 2016, page 158; Экономическая конъюнктура в Дальневосточном 
федеральном округе в 2016 г., Пространственная экономика, № 2, 2016, page 164; http://dvtu.cu-
stoms.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18715:-4-2015-&catid=63:stat-vnesh-
-torg-cat&Itemid=282 / 
Asian	countries	have	the	largest	share	of	trade	with	the	Russian	Far	East	
at	over	80%, the key partners being South Korea, Japan and China. Trade with 
European countries is marginal; the European Union’s share of the macrore-
gion’s trade is only 10%. A detailed specification is provided in Table 3. 
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Table 3. The key trade partners of the Russian Far East (in %)
2013 2014 2015 2016
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
ex
po
rt
im
po
rt
tr
ad
e
Japan 32.6 14.4 27.1 29.7 16.9 26.3 32 12.6 27.8 25.7 7.3 21.3
south 
Korea 30.1 12.1 24.7 32 10.6 26.2 29.1 7.8 24.4 26.2 11.0 22.6
china 19.4 46.8 27.7 19 45 26 19 43.8 24.5 20.7 39.4 25.1
other 17.9 26.7 20.5 19.3 27.5 21.5 19.9 35.8 23.3 27.4 42.38 8.4
Source: Экономическая конъюнктура в Дальневосточном федеральном округе в 2014 г., Про­
странственная экономика, № 2, 2015, page 159; Экономическая конъюнктура в Дальневосточном 
федеральном округе в 2015 г., Пространственная экономика, № 3, 2016, page 152; Экономическая 
конъюнктура в Дальневосточном федеральном округе в 2016 г., Пространственная экономика, № 2, 
2017, page 166. 
The main trade partners of Sakhalin Oblast are traditionally Japan (43.4% of 
total trade) and South Korea (40.2% of total trade). Japan is the key recipient of 
liquefied natural gas exported from Sakhalin, while South Korea buys mainly 
crude oil and coal. 
The main trade partner for Primorsky Krai is China – 51% of total trade. In the 
case of Yakutia, the most important partner is Belgium (55% of total trade) – Ya-
kutian diamonds are exported to Belgian polishing plants. Yakutia’s other ma-
jor trade partners are India, China and Israel, considering exports of precious 
metals and stones. In the case of Khabarovsk Krai and the Jewish Autonomous 
Oblast, the geographical structure of foreign trade is not really diversified – 
84% and 94.5% of their production, respectively, is sold to the Chinese market. 
Khabarovsk Krai exports mainly timber and related products, and the Jew-
ish Autonomous Oblast exports timber and soy. In the case of Amur Oblast the 
most important trade partner is China, and the key exports are metal ores and 
timber. Magadan Oblast does most of its trade with South Korea (79.1% export 
share), exporting mainly mineral products, fish and other food, and also gold 
and silver. Fish products are the main exports in the case of Kamchatka Krai 
and Chukotka Autonomous Oblast – 97% and 85% export share, respectively, and 
the key trade partners are South Korea, China, Japan and the USA5. 
5 Деловой портрет Дальнего Востока, http://www.eastrussia.ru/material/delovoy-portret 
-dalnego-vostoka/ 
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3. The evolution of the russian far east development concept 
An analysis of the Soviet/Russian government’s policy towards the Russian Far 
East shows that three main strategic approaches can be identified. Firstly, con-
sidering its geostrategic location, the region has been viewed as an area of great 
importance for the development of infrastructure and the defence industry. 
Secondly, the fact that the Far East is geographically remote from the centre of 
the country has entailed the need to launch initiatives aimed at building eco-
nomic ties with the remaining Russian territory. Thirdly, the identified resource 
potential of the region began to be perceived as an opportunity for building 
durable economic relations with neighbouring countries, and thus using this 
as an impetus for the region’s economic development. 
3.1. The Soviet period
The so-called ‘autonomisation	strategy’ which envisaged that the region’s own 
funds and resources would be the main driving engine of the region’s develop-
ment, given the difficult situation in the central part of the Soviet Union, was 
implemented in the Far East in the period immediately following the revolution 
in 1917 and in the 1920s. The regional government thus focused on implement-
ing the industrialisation programme, concentrating its efforts mainly on the 
development of such branches of industry as timber processing, fish processing 
and gold and coal mining. Towards the end of the 1920s, the Soviet government 
began gradually shifting towards the policy of regaining control of the region, 
making actions taken in the region subordinate to the strategy of the Soviet 
centre. The consequences of this included intensifying the region’s exploita-
tion and increasing the level of its subsidies from the central budget by raising 
wages, offering subsidies to the companies which were partly allocated for by 
paying high tariffs and energy expenses. 
A qualitative change took place in the early 1960s, when the Soviet government 
decided to partly redirect regional production to the Eastern Asian markets. 
Thus the production model operating so far – which was principally adapted 
only for the military’s needs – began gradually changing. Establishing co-oper-
ation with Japan was expected to be a means of boosting development of civil-
ian production; the co-operation initiated in the mid 1960s concerned timber 
processing. 
Although regional subsidies for defence purposes originally began increasing 
due to the growing military threat from China from the late 1960s, serious cuts 
16
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ultimately had to be made in these subsidies due to the increasingly difficult 
economic situation, especially in the late 1970s – early 1980s. Attempts were 
made to compensate for the weakening state support via a renewed openness 
to intensifying trade with the Eastern Asian countries6. However, the uncom-
petitiveness of Soviet production on the one hand and the deteriorating mac-
roeconomic situation of the USSR on the other turned out to be serious barriers 
to this. 
3.2. The 1990s
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian government principally 
did not take any action that would result in a major improvement of the region’s 
economic situation. Since the state had in fact given up subsidising unprofitable 
regional production, even in the case of the defence industry, an attempt was 
made to reorient trade to external markets. However, none of the anticipated 
outlets for uncompetitive Russian production were found and, as a consequence, 
this led to a gradual deindustrialisation of the region. The difficult macroeco-
nomic situation in Russia, which reached its peak during the financial and eco-
nomic crisis in 1998, forced the region to rely on its own resources. 
3.3. The rule of Vladimir Putin
The real significance of the Russian Far East in Moscow’s policy began to grow as 
Vladimir Putin took power. The new Russian president was the first to formulate 
the proposal of ‘advanced’ development of the Far East. However, this was not 
so much a consequence of a change in the federal government’s policy towards 
the regions but rather an outcome of the new geopolitical strategy being de-
veloped by the Kremlin, an important element of which was re-establishing 
co-operation with Eastern Asian countries. Using the potential of the fuel and 
energy sector was a key means to achieve this goal. Another important factor 
was the significant improvement of the economic situation in Russia, itself re-
sulting above all from growing revenues generated by exports of oil and gas. 
Significant (as compared to the 1990s) financial support, offered both from 
budget funds and by the most important state-owned companies, began to be 
provided in order to implement the announced priorities. Funds were invested 
6 А. А. Кокошин, Вопросы долгосрочного развития Восточной Сибири и российского 
Дальнего Востока в контексте глобальной политической и экономической динамики, 
Moscow 2012, pages 23-24. 
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mainly in the development of transport infrastructure (including oil and gas 
transport infrastructure) and the development of raw material deposits. Pavel 
Minakir branded this strategy as a concept of cross-border raw material transit, 
the main intended goal of which was to enable the state to export oil and gas to 
external markets7. 
One	proof	of	Moscow’s	increasing	interest	in	the	region	is	the	fact	that	
three	development	programmes	covering	the	Russian	Far	East	were	adopt-
ed	between	2000	and	2015:	one	in	2002,	one	in	2007	and	one	in	2013.	
A characteristic feature of the programme adopted in 2007 (covering the period 
between 2008 and 2013) was the fact that the central government took a strate-
gic decision to increase the level of federal investments in the region. In fact, the 
investments were made by state-owned corporations, and the projects initiated 
concerned only infrastructure development. Thus, the intention of the govern-
ment in Moscow was to transfer engagement in the region to state-owned and 
private corporations. Their potential incomes from the sale of oil and gas on 
the increasingly receptive Asian markets are expected to guarantee a constant 
presence and economic engagement in the regions. 
The programme for 2008–2013 was successful in terms of transport infra-
structure development. Some ports were modernised (Vanino, Zarubino and 
Vostochny). Since the projects were beneficial for the corporations themselves, 
the state did not have to offer any special financial support apart from back-
ing them politically; at the same time, no initiatives were taken that would be 
aimed directly at regional development of the Russian Far East, understood as 
supporting other branches of the economy in addition to the energy and trans-
port sectors. 
In 2009, the government adopted the Strategy for Socio-Economic Development 
of the Far East and the Baikal Region to 20258. Most of its assumptions have not 
been implemented as of yet due to the government’s failure to allocate sufficient 
funds. In many cases this was the result of the government’s concerns that the 
budget funds would not be used effectively, as had been the case with many 
previous projects and that the local government elites would be the beneficia-
ries of the subsidies provided. 
7 П. А. Минакир, О концепции долгосрочного развития экономики макрорегиона 
Дальний Восток, Пространственная экономика, №1, page 20. 
8 Russian government’s regulation of 28 December 2009 no. 2094-r. 
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In 2009, Viktor Ishayev, the then presidential plenipotentiary envoy in the Far 
Eastern Federal District of Russia, pointed out that in order to boost develop-
ment of the Far East it was necessary to significantly increase state investments 
(develop the market driven by state demand. This in fact meant returning to 
one of the concepts implemented in the Soviet era, which was based on the as-
sumption that if the state was interested in achieving certain goals, it had to 
provide adequate funds for this. 
The Russian government wanted the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 
summit, held in September 2012 in Vladivostok, to become an epoch-making 
moment in the contemporary history of the Far East. The Kremlin’s intention 
was to demonstrate interest in deepening Russian activity in Eastern Asia and 
enhancing political and economic co-operation with the countries in the region. 
It turned out that hosting the summit consumed an enormous sum of money 
– the state spent around US$20 billion on this event, and the allocated funds 
were spent predominantly on the construction of bridges and roads and airport 
modernisation9. However, the summit had very limited economic and political 
consequences, including those in the context of regional development of the Far 
East, notwithstanding the infrastructure built in Vladivostok (including a new 
airport with an access road to the city, bridges and a new complex of buildings 
of the Far Eastern Federal University).
As the Eastern direction began gaining significance in Russian government 
policy (the ‘turn to the East’) in 2013, President Putin in his address to the Fed-
eral Assembly (December 2012) informed that the development of the Far East 
and Eastern Siberia would be Russia’s national priority in the 21st century10. 
Then it was decided to prepare another strategy and programme for the region’s 
socio-economic development, and the newly established Ministry for the Devel-
opment of the Russian Far East was placed in charge of this11. 
The	first	effect	of	the	new	ministry’s	work	was	the	Programme	of	Socio-
Economic	Development	of	the	Far	East	and	Baikal	Region	adopted	by	the	
government	in	March	2013.	The programme provided for reconstruction and 
9 АТЭС-2012: навстречу саммиту в авральном режиме, http://newsland.com/user/4296757178/
content/ates-2012-navstrechu-sammitu-v-avralnom-rezhime/4383375 
10 Путин: развитие Сибири и Дальнего Востока - приоритет 21 века, http://www.topnews24.
ru/news/headlines_krasnoyarsk/70799-putin-razvitie-sibiri-i-dalnego-vostoka-prioritet-
21-veka.html 
11 The new ministry was established on 21 May 2012. 
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modernisation of most of the economic sectors which had been neglected for dec-
ades, and its estimated value was 10.6 trillion roubles, i.e. around US$33.3 billion 
according to the then exchange rate (including 3.8 trillion roubles, i.e. around 
US$11.9 billion, from the federal budget). The financial assumptions adopted as 
part of the programme turned out to be completely unrealistic, given the dete-
riorating state budget situation. This was the main reason for the dismissal of 
the then Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East, Viktor Ishayev12. 
The programme prepared by Ishayev was not really innovative, and its pillars 
were large infrastructural projects, mainly in the transport sector, which were 
intended to provide a stimulus to region’s development. 
The new minister, Aleksandr Galushka, and the presidential plenipotentiary 
envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District, Yury Trutnev, presented their own 
concept for the region’s development. The programme envisaged in the con-
cept did not differ much from the previous one – the priority goals included 
developing production meant for export and investments in the development 
of transport infrastructure and the energy sector. What was excluded from the 
programme were the expensive sectoral projects present in the previous agenda 
and expenses on developing the healthcare system, education and social wel-
fare. Furthermore, it was decided to finance part of the strategic infrastructural 
investments from the special federal programme ‘Development of the Trans-
port System’. This concerned such projects as BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline) 
and Transsib (for more information, see part II). Thus, the main consequence 
of the programme’s amendment was – as anticipated by Moscow – significant 
reduction of the financial assumptions (from initially planned 3.8 trillion rou-
bles from the federal budget to 346 billion roubles). The modified version of the 
programme was adopted by the government in April 2014. 
Two federal programmes became binding, Economic and Social Development of 
the Russian Far East and the Baikal Region to 201813 and Socio-Economic Devel-
opment of the Kuril Islands in 2007–201514, the implementation of which was to 
12 Viktor Ishayev performed the function of the special presidential plenipotentiary envoy 
in the Far Eastern Federal District from 30 April 2009 to 21 May 2012, and he served as the 
minister for development of the Russian Far East from 21 May 2012 to 31 August 2013. 
13 Постановление от 15 апреля 2014 г. № 308 Об утверждении государственной программы 
Российской Федерации «Социально-экономическое развитие Дальнего Востока и 
Байкальского региона», http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/upload/iblock/6ed/gp34.pdf 
14 Федеральная целевая программа «Социально-экономическое развитие курильских 
островов (Сахалинская область) на период до 2025 года», http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/
upload/iblock/25f/KO2025.pdf 
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be coordinated by the State Commission for the Socio-Economic Development 
of the Far East, the Republic of Buryatia, the Trans-Baikal Territory and the 
Irkutsk Region. The commission was chaired by Prime Minister Dmitry Med-
vedev, and its members included heads of the largest state-owned companies 
and banks, representatives of ministries, governors and representatives of the 
State Duma and the Federation Council15. The implementation of the eight-year 
programme covering the Kuril Islands has had tangible effects only as regards 
infrastructure and the social sector: modernisation of the water supply and 
heat distribution networks, and bringing into operation an airport, a geother-
mal station and a hospital. Unfortunately, the implemented projects were not 
aimed at developing the region’s economy. The main reasons for the lack of pro-
development actions were the undersize budget (628.3 million roubles), which 
was much smaller than the one envisaged under the new programme for the 
development of the Kuril Islands in 2016–2025 (70 billion roubles) and ineffec-
tive governance by the then government of Sakhalin Oblast (in 2007–2015, the 
oblast was governed by Aleksandr Khoroshavin, who was arrested in March 
2015 on charges of corruption)16. 
3.4. The Territories of Advanced Development 
The	Russian	government’s	policy	and	the	concepts,	strategies	and	pro-
grammes	adopted	before	–	regardless	of	the	declared	intention	to	ensure	
comprehensive	development	of	the	region	–were	in	fact	targeted	at	con-
tinuing	the	development	of	the	region	as	a	resource	base	for	fossil	fuels	
The concept of creating so-called	 ‘Territories	of	Advanced	Development’	
(Территории	опережающего	развития;	TOR)	in the Russian Far East,	with 
preferential	conditions for doing business where industrial production will be 
concentrated, fits in with this logic. 
In order to boost and more efficiently utilise the resource potential of the Rus-
sian Far East, and to modernise and develop the processing sector, it is neces-
sary to make costly investments for which there have been no sufficient funds 
15 Состав Правительственной комиссии по вопросам социально-экономического раз-
вития Дальнего Востока и Байкальского региона в редакции распоряжения от 10 де-
кабря 2015 года №2517-р, http://government.ru/info/21015/ 
16 Курилы защитят новой федеральной программой, http://politrussia.com/world/razvi-
tie-dalnikh-rubezhey-440/ 
21
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
6/
20
17
for many years17. The greater part of tax revenues from fossil fuels extraction, 
processing and export goes to the federal budget, while regional budgets receive 
only a small fraction of the revenues. Furthermore, many large corporations 
operating in the Russian Far East are registered in Moscow or Saint Petersburg, 
and pay taxes in these cities. This has led to the Far East’s increasing reliance 
on the influx of investments financed from the federal budget and also on the 
influx of foreign capital. The extremely hard geological and climatic conditions 
and the large distances generate high costs (high capital intensity) of extrac-
tion and transport of the fossil fuels to the distant outlets. Investors’ activity 
in the region is only possible owing to tax relief and other financial incentives 
offered that allow them to compensate for the high costs of doing business in 
the Russian Far East. 
The Territories of Advanced Development were established under the act 
signed by President Putin in December 2014 in response to investors’ expec-
tations. Companies operating in the TORs will benefit from: the preferential 
taxation system, including an insurance rate of 7.6% instead of 30% for the 
first ten years; a five-year ‘tax holiday’ (income tax, real estate tax and land 
tax) which does not cover the mining tax in the case of oil and gas field opera-
tion; and the possibility to get a VAT rebate as part of a simplified and acceler-
ated procedure and a relief in the tax on extraction of mineral resources. It is 
estimated that the preferential financial conditions will attract in the coming 
ten years foreign investments worth 1 trillion roubles (i.e. around US$16.2 bil-
lion according to the exchange rate applicable in 2016). Seventeen Territories 
of Advanced Development have been established so far in the Far East: four 
in Primorsky Krai, three in Khabarovsk Krai, three in Amur Oblast, two in 
Sakhalin Oblast, two in Yakutia, one in Chukotka Autonomous Oblast, one in 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast and one in Kamchatka Krai. A detailed specifica-
tion is provided in Table 4. 
17 The level of depreciation of equipment used in diamond mining is 41%, in the case of hydro-
carbons extraction it is 49%, and in the timber industry it stands at 55%. The situation in 
the fuel and energy sector is especially difficult. Without state subsidies the sector has no 
prospects for any major development.
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Table 4. List of Territories of Advanced Development established in the Rus-
sian Far East18 (according to the creation dates)
Tor name creation date location area of operation
Khabarovsk 25 June 2015
Khabarovsk 
Krai
Transport and logistics, metallurgy; planned in-
vestments using private funds: 30 billion roubles; 
planned federal budget expenses: 1.258 billion 
roubles; planned expenses from the regional 
budget and of extra-budgetary funds: 1.103 billion 
roubles; around 3,000 jobs are expected to be 
created
Komsomolsk 25 June 2015
Khabarovsk 
Krai
Production of parts for the aviation industry; 
planned investments using private funds: 15 bil-
lion roubles; planned federal budget expenses: 
902.6 million roubles; planned expenses from the 
regional budget and of extra-budgetary funds: 
329.64 million roubles; around 3,000 jobs are 
expected to be created
nadezhdins-
kaya
25 June 
2015
Primorsky 
Krai
Logistic and transport services; planned invest-
ments using private funds: 6.7 billion roubles; 
planned federal budget expenses: 1.986 billion 
roubles; planned expenses from the regional 
budget and of extra-budgetary funds: 1.986 bil-
lion roubles; around 1,600 jobs are expected to be 
created 
mikhailovs-
kaya
21 
August 
2015
Primorsky 
Krai
Agriculture; planned private investments: 39 bil-
lion roubles; planned federal budget expenses: 
2.219 billion roubles; planned expenses from the 
regional budget and of extra-budgetary funds: 
2.219 billion roubles; around 2,400 jobs are ex-
pected to be created
Belogorsk
21 
August 
2015
Amur 
Oblast
A soy processing plant and other plants in the 
food industry; planned private investments: 
1.45 billion roubles; planned expenses from the 
regional budget and of extra-budgetary funds: 
46.2 million roubles; around 200 jobs are expect-
ed to be created
priamurskaya
21 
August 
2015
Amur 
Oblast
A cement factory; planned investments using pri-
vate funds: 130 billion roubles; around 1,500 jobs 
are expected to be created
Kangalassy
21 
August 
2015
Yakutia
Processing industry (mainly oil and gas); a ce-
ment factory; planned private investments: 
1.11 billion roubles; planned federal budget 
expenses: 113.2 million roubles; planned expenses 
from the regional budget and of extra-budgetary 
funds: 87 million roubles; around 350 jobs are 
expected to be created
18 Four TORs have been established so far outside the Far East: ‘Gukovo’ in Rostov Oblast, 
‘Neberezhnye Chelny’ in Tatarstan, ‘Usolye-Sibirskoye’ in Irkutsk Oblast, ‘Sarov’ in the 
Nizhny Novgorod region. Situation as of 30 April 2017. 
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Tor name creation date location area of operation
Beringovsky
21 
August 
2015
Chukotka 
Autono-
mous Oblast
Coal mining; planned investments using private 
funds: 8 billion roubles; around 450 jobs are ex-
pected to be created
Kamchatka
28 
August 
2015
Kamchatka 
Krai
A tourist and recreational cluster and a transit 
port for goods exported via the Northern Sea 
Route; planned private investments: 28.1 bil-
lion roubles; planned federal budget expenses: 
5.728 billion roubles; planned expenses from the 
regional budget: 2.737 billion roubles; around 
3,000 jobs are expected to be created
Bolshoy Kamen
28 
January 
2016
Primorsky 
Krai
The goal of its establishment is effective develop-
ment of shipbuilding using the Zvezda complex as 
a base; planned expenses from the federal budget: 
3.152 billion roubles; 5,500 jobs are expected to be 
created 
Yuzhnaya
16 
March 
2016
Sakhalin 
Oblast 
Agriculture (poultry breeding); planned private 
investments: 6.3 billion roubles; planned ex-
penses from the regional budget and of extra-
budgetary funds: 1.46 billion roubles; 450 jobs are 
expected to be created
Gorny vozdukh
16 
March 
2016
Sakhalin 
Oblast
A tourist and recreational complex; planned 
private investments: 6.1 billion roubles; planned 
expenses from the regional budget and of extra-
budgetary funds: 10.031 billion roubles; 725 jobs 
are expected to be created
amuro-
Khinganskaya
27 
August 
2016
Jewish Au-
tonomous 
Oblast
creation of complex enterprises, including 
processing enterprises of consumer goods and 
food industries, hotel and exhibition centers and 
many others
Yuzhnaya 
Yakutia
28  
Decem-
ber 2016 
Yakutia
7 mining, transport and logistics and industrial 
projects; planned private investments: 24.7 
billion rubles; the entire infrastructure will be 
created at the expense of investors
neftekhimich-
esky
7 March 
2017 
Primorsky 
Krai
Rosneft will be the main investor. It is planning 
to build a petrochemical planned; the company 
plans to invest in total around 0.5 trillion roubles
nikolayevsk 19 April 2017
Khabarovsk 
Krai
Industrial center for deep processing of aquatic 
bioresources in the Far East
svobodny 3 June 2017
Amur 
Oblast
Gazprom and SIBUR will be the main investors. 
They are planning to build gas processing plants; 
the two companies plan to invest in total around 
1.2 trillion roubles 
Source: Территории опережающего развития: 12 особых зон в ДФО, http://tass.ru/info/2215388; 
http://government.ru/docs/27962/; http://www.dfo.gov.ru/press/news_DV/1756/; http://government.ru/
docs/25925/; http://government.ru/docs/27406/; http://static.government.ru/media/files/XB98Ar6or-
WvxNg21ZnM8ui27A6LuYkpX.pdf 
The federal government is planning to establish more TORs. Rosneft has made 
efforts to ensure that preferential financial conditions are provided for the 
planned refinery near Nakhodka (it will be the main investor as part of a TOR 
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planned to be established in Primorsky Krai19) along with United Aircraft Cor-
poration and its subsidiary Sukhoi, whose aircraft plants in Komsomolsk-on-
Amur are among the largest manufacturers in the Far East. Other companies 
interested in the financial incentives are: United Shipbuilding Corporation20 
which owns the Amur shipyard; Gazprom, which is planning to build a gas 
processing plant in Belogorsk (Amur Oblast) jointly with SIBUR (after the Power 
of Siberia gas pipeline has been built)21; Rosnano, which is engaged in the pro-
duction of composite materials in Yakutia (Basalt project)22. TORs are also ex-
pected to cover port infrastructure (the ports of Zarubino, Sovetskaya Gavan 
and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky). The preferential investing conditions applica-
ble in the TORs are also expected to apply to investments in the Kuril Islands23.
It will be impossible to turn the Far East into a region with a diversified and 
competitive economy if only budgetary funds are used. The government opti-
mistically assumes that investments of public funds will attract private capital. 
It is estimated in the programme that each invested rouble of public funds will 
attract around seven roubles of private investments. The Far East and Baikal 
Region Development Fund established in 2011 is expected to support the imple-
mentation of large investment projects. However, despite its recapitalisation 
up to the level of 15 billion roubles24, it has not become an effective instrument 
for financing pro-development initiatives. One of the reasons is that the fund 
prefers financing projects with a high rate of return and those characterised 
by a quick return of invested funds, while the infrastructural projects being 
implemented in the macroregion fail to meet such conditions. At present, a re-
capitalisation of the fund with taxes on the implementation of infrastructural 
projects in the Far East is under consideration.
19 Проект ВНХК «Роснефти» подкрепят статусом территории опережающего развития, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2883809; Проект ВНХК станет центром ТОР «Неф-
техимический» в Приморье, http://tass.ru/ekonomika/2634881 
20 Взойдет «Звезда». Территорией опережающего развития, http://vladnews.ru/3880/
po d robnosti/vzojdet-zvezda-territoriej-operezhayushhego-razvitiya.html 
21 Газоперерабатывающий завод «Газпрома» может получить льготы, http://www.vedo-
mosti.ru/business/articles/2015/06/17/596652-gazopererabativayuschii-zavod-gazproma -
mozhet-poluchit-lgoti 
22 Территории опережающего развития: лучше меньше, да лучше?, http://www.eastrus-
sia.ru/material/territorii_operezhayushchego_razvitiya_luchshe_menshe_da_luchshe/ 
23 Дмитрий Медведев: Курильские острова могут получить статус ТОР, http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/2774005 
24 The fund’s initial capital was 500 million roubles at the moment of its establishment.
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Many experts believe that the TORs will remain another initiative of the re-
gional government (as with the already non-functioning special economic zones 
in Khabarovsk Krai and Primorsky Krai) whose implementation will not have 
a palpable impact on the economic development of the Russian Far East. Another 
reason for scepticism is the proposal to launch TORs without having conducted 
a comprehensive economic analysis of their effectiveness and usefulness for the 
region. Furthermore, in order to launch the operation of TORs it is necessary 
to prepare a costly infrastructure financed from both the federal budget and 
regional budgets, which may be difficult to achieve given the present difficult 
situation facing the Russian economy alongside the regions’ debts. Only large 
corporations can benefit from the TORs because they are targeted not at devel-
oping local business but towards export-oriented production. 
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II. enerGY and TransporT: ‘The flYWheels’ 
of The far easT’s developmenT 
Regardless of the programme goals set forth in the documents which envisage 
comprehensive development of the Russian Far East, the Russian government’s 
measures have in practice been concentrated mainly on the energy and trans-
port sectors. 
1. The energy sector
1.1. The resource potential
Oil	and	gas	resources	are the region’s most strategic wealth. The largest oil 
fields are located in Yakutia and on the shelf of the Sea of Okhotsk. Estimated 
total oil resources stand at 10–14 billion tonnes. Natural gas is extracted in three 
large production centres: Irkutsk, centred around the Kovykta gas field, Yaku-
tia, centred around the Chayanda field, and Sakhalin. The estimated total poten-
tial of the gas fields is around 14–15 trillion m3, which accounts for almost 1/3 of 
total confirmed natural gas resources in Russian territory. In addition to this, 
the region has rich deposits of brown coal, coking coal and anthracite (mainly 
in Yakutia, Irkutsk, Amur and Magadan Oblasts and in Primorsky Krai). 
According to data for 2015, oil output in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia 
reached almost 63.5 million tonnes, and natural gas output around 40.9 billion 
m3, i.e. more than envisaged in the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up 
to 2030. According to this document, until 2020, oil production in the Far East 
and Eastern Siberia region is expected to grow to 71–83 million tonnes, and 
natural gas production to 91–112 billion m3 (a detailed medium- and long-term 
forecast is provided in Tables 5 and 6). 
Table 5. Actual and forecasted oil production (in millions of tonnes)
actual production production forecasted in the strategy
2005 2008 2015 2015 2020–2022 2030
eastern siberia 0.2 0.5 37.1 21–33 41–52 75–69
far east 4.4 13.8 26.4 23–25 30–31 32–33
russia total 470.2 487.6 534 486–495 505–525 530–535
Source: Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030; www.gks.ru 
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Table 6. Actual and forecasted gas production (in billion m3)
actual production production forecasted in the strategy 
2005 2008 2015 2015 2020-2022 2030
eastern siberia 4 4 9.2 9–13 26–55 45–65
far east
(mainly sakhalin)
3
(2)
9
(7)
31.7
34–40
(31–36)
65–67
(36–37)
85–87
(50–51)
russia total 641 664 635 685–745 803-837 885–940
Source: Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030; www.gks.ru
In the case of the gas	sector,	production is expected to grow primarily owing to 
the operation of the gas fields located in two Eastern Siberian production centres: 
Irkutsk and Yakutia; their resources are intended to be the base for Russian gas 
supplies to China. The Irkutsk complex includes the Kovykta field, which con-
tains 1.5 trillion m3 of natural gas; the target annual output is planned to reach 
35 billion m3. In turn, the Yakutia complex covers the Chayanda field, containing 
1.2 trillion m3 of natural gas, and its target annual output is supposed to reach 
25 billion m3. According to the announcement made by the Federal Agency for the 
Use of Natural Resources in 2010, the operation of the Chayanda field was due to 
commence in 2016. It was announced in March 2014 that the onset of gas extrac-
tion had been postponed: in the case of the Chayanda field until no sooner than 
2019 and in the case of the Kovykta field no earlier than 2024. A new stimulus 
for the development of these gas fields came when Gazprom and CNPC signed 
a contract covering Russian gas supplies to China in 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. 
The thirty-year contract stipulates that ultimately 38 billion m3 of gas will be ex-
ported annually via the so-called ‘Eastern Route’, i.e. from the Eastern Siberian 
fields via Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk to China25. One day after the con-
tract was signed, the CEO of Gazprom ordered work to be conducted that would 
enable the commencement of operation of the Chayanda field towards the end 
of 2018. The promised acceleration of the preparatory work does not guarantee 
that Gazprom will be able to comply with its contractual obligations in the initial 
phase of the contract’s term. Given the fact that the initial start of production at 
the Chayanda field has been rolled back from 2017 to 2019, the production target 
of 16.1 billion m3 that was supposed be hit in 2018 will most likely not be attained 
25 For more information, see: Sz. Kardaś, The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC 
strike a deal on gas supplies to China, OSW Commentary, 16 June 2014, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-06-16/eastern-partnership-gas-gazprom-
and-cnpc-strike-a-deal-gas 
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until at least 2020, with the option that output will not reach 25 billion m3 until 
2024 or 2025. In the case of Kovykta, output in the initial period (2024) will be at 
around 3.4 billion m3, and the level of 30 billion m3 will take 15 years of operation 
to be reached even in the optimistic scenario. Furthermore, the development of 
new fields will require large investments: around US$13.5 billion in the case of 
Chayanda and around US$11–15 billion in the case of Kovykta26.
As regards the oil	sector,	the most promising are the Eastern Siberian fields 
owned by Rosneft. Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, has confirmed oil re-
sources of 2.36 billion tonnes, and its unconfirmed but promising oil resources 
are estimated at 1.6 billion tonnes. Even though part of the fields already in 
operation are located not far away from the ESPO (Eastern Siberia – Pacific 
Ocean) oil pipeline, most of the fields, especially those which are only planned 
to be put into operation, are situated quite far from the pipeline: 300–800 km, 
and some even 1,500 km away from it. Furthermore, given the much more dif-
ficult geographical conditions, geological work conducted in the fields is more 
expensive and takes on average double the time than was the case with the 
Western Siberian fields27. 
Lack	of	funding	is	the	main	barrier	causing	delays	in	the	field	development	
plans.	On the one hand, almost 40% of the total amount of funds allocated by 
the federal government for geological work goes to Eastern Siberia and the Far 
East (5.5 billion roubles in 2012; 5.8 billion roubles in 2013, 5.1 billion roubles 
in 2014 and less than 4 billion roubles in 2015). On the other hand, these funds 
are insufficient in comparison to what is required and, according to experts’ 
estimates, should be increased by at least 30%. Secondly, low oil prices and the 
increasing fiscal burden imposed on Russian oil firms has led to a reduction of 
energy companies’ investment budgets and thus will contribute to delays in the 
development of new fields. 
Another	potential	obstacle	to	the	development	of	the	gas	fields	–	albeit	in	
the	long	term	–	is	that	of	sanctions.	The imposition of the so-called ‘techno-
logical sanctions’28 may gravely affect gas extraction projects on the coastal 
26 Ibidem.
27 Восточный фронт, Нефтегазовая вертикаль, 2013, № 20, pages 28-29. 
28 It is forbidden under EU regulations to supply to Russia any equipment, technologies and 
services linked to exploration and development of deep-water, Arctic and shale oil fields. 
The USA has imposed analogous sanctions on Rosneft, Gazpromneft, Transneft, Gazprom, 
LUKoil, Novatek and Surgutneftegaz. A ban on imports and exports of weapons and mili-
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shelf, especially the Sakhalin shelf. The projects implemented there are 100% 
dependent on imports of equipment and technologies from Western countries, 
mainly the USA. One consequence of maintaining the restrictions in this area 
could be a 5- to 10-year delay in the implementation of these projects, which will 
make it more difficult to achieve the parameters envisaged in the latest version 
of the draft version of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2035 
(an increase in output from the shelf from the present level of 17 million tonnes 
to 50 million tonnes in 2035)29. 
One example of how the sanctions mechanism operates is the imposition of US 
sanctions on the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field located in Sakhalin (the decision was 
announced on 7 August 2015)30. Natural gas extracted from this field was to be 
used as a raw material base for exports as part of the planned development of 
the Sakhalin-2 LNG terminal. Gazprom planned to engage the US firm FMC for 
developing the field (making drills on fields located underwater). The sanctions 
regime may delay the production launch until 2020 (in 2025–2027, the field was 
expected to supply around 16 billion m3 of natural gas). Sanction measures were 
imposed on this field shortly after Gazprom had signed a strategic co-operation 
agreement with Shell (in June 2015 in Saint Petersburg). 
Table 7. Increase in oil reserves (in millions of tonnes)
2015 2020–2022 2030
eastern siberia 165 1200 1200
russia total 1854 5597 5122
Source: Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 
Table 8. Increase in gas reserves (in billions m3)
2015 2020–2022 2030
eastern siberia 480 1400 1200
russia total 4100 5400 6500
Source: Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 
tary equipment to and from Russia and on supplying dual-use goods and technologies to 
Russia for civil and military purposes has also been imposed.
29 Минэнерго ожидает роста добычи нефти на шельфе до 50 млн тонн в 2035 г., http://
ria.ru/economy/20150915/1252471672.html#ixzz3uZkQr2k7 
30 This was the first case where sanctions were imposed on an individual Russian project 
(field). 
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1.2. The infrastructure
The Far East plays an extremely important role in the context of the key as-
sumptions of Russian energy policy, particularly those concerning the devel-
opment of infrastructure enabling the diversification of Russian oil and gas 
export routes. 
The	ESPO	oil	pipeline	(built	in	2007–2012)	was	the	first	pipeline	project	of	
strategic	significance. Its first section, running from Tayshet to Skovorodino, 
entered operation in 2010 (with an initial capacity of 50 million tonnes). The sec-
ond section of ESPO-2, connecting Skovorodino and Kozmino, came into opera-
tion in December 2012 (initial capacity of 30 million tonnes). Another important 
section is the branch running from Skovorodino to Mohe in China, since this 
enables exports of Russian oil to China directly by land. In December 2014, the 
CEO of Transneft announced an increase in the transport capacity of the ESPO-1 
pipeline from 50 to 58 million tonnes. 
This oil pipeline is of fundamental significance for Russia because it enables 
Russian oil exports to Asian markets, especially China, Japan and South Korea. 
Since the launch of the Far Eastern pipeline, the role played by the Asian route 
in Russian oil exports has been steadily growing. In 2015, China achieved the 
status of the primary individual Russian oil importer (in aggregate, taking into 
account all routes, it imported 41.29 million tonnes of crude oil from Russia). 
Japan and South Korea have also become important recipients of Russian oil31. 
However, the present transport capacity is insufficient, considering the Russian 
companies’ (mainly Rosneft’s) plans to increase crude oil exports. In 2016, Kozmi-
no port practically reached the limits of its export capacity32. Meanwhile, it is 
impossible to increase the oil flow capacity of the ESPO branch running to China 
(Skovorodino–Mohe) due to delays in construction work on the Chinese side33. 
31 For more information, see: M. Kaczmarski, Sz. Kardaś, ‘The oil friendship’: the state of and 
prospects for Russian-Chinese energy cooperation, OSW Commentary, 17 February 2016, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-02-17/oil-friendship-
state-and-prospects-russian-chinese-energy
32 The port’s present capacity is around 31.5 million tonnes. Rosneft will be forced to launch 
negotiations to receive additional export quotas granted by Transneft to LUKoil and Sur-
gutneftegaz. Роснефти для поставок в Китай нужен весь обьем ВСТО, http://www.kom-
mersant.ru/doc/2655227 
33 This version has been presented by the Russian side, for example, the CEO of Transneft, 
Nikolai Tokarev. According to arrangements with CNPC, Rosneft was obliged to increase 
exports to China in 2015 by 5 million tonnes, and in 2018 up to 30 million tonnes. Initially, 
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As previously assumed, an increase in the transport capacity of existing infra-
structure is expected by 2020: in the case of the Tayshet–Skovorodino section 
this would take it to 80 million tonnes, and in the case of the Skovorodino–
Kozmino section to 50 million tonnes. According to estimates made in February 
2014, the cost of such infrastructure investment would reach 172 billion roubles 
(around US$3 billion). Although the falling oil prices and the limited opportu-
nities of attracting external capital due to sanctions may to some extent make 
the implementation of these investment plans more difficult, given the fact that 
energy co-operation with China is a priority for Russia, and is politically sup-
ported by Vladimir Putin, one might presume that any potential financial dif-
ficulties will be overcome, and that infrastructural oil projects will be carried 
through to completion. 
The	second	strategic	project,	announced	in	May	2014,	is	the	construction	
of	the	Power	of	Siberia-1	gas	pipeline	connecting Russian Eastern Siberian 
fields and the north-eastern provinces of China. The implementation of the 
project commenced after Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract in May 
201434. The new Russian project is extremely expensive. According to initial 
estimates, the costs of infrastructure construction and the development of the 
fields to be used as the sources of supplies may reach as high as US$55 billion. 
Gazprom, contrary to initial announcements, has been unable to obtain a loan 
of US$25 billion from China that had been promised already in 2014 and which 
might have facilitated the implementation of the investment. The loan of 2 bil-
lion euros granted to Gazprom by Bank of China in early March 2016 is only 
a small part of the total investment costs35. 
The new infrastructure, even though it is intended to be used mainly for export 
purposes, may also play a certain role in the region’s gasification programme. 
it was planned to increase the transported volume of oil using the Skovorodino–Mohe pipe-
line (a branch of the ESPO oil pipeline). However, it was impossible to actually increase the 
volume of oil transported via the Skovorodino–Mohe pipeline, either in 2015 or 2016; the 
main reason for this was unfinished work on the Chinese side. Furthermore, according to 
information provided by the CEO of Transneft in December 2016, China will not be ready to 
receive more oil via the Skovorodino–Mohe pipeline until 2018 (up to the level of 26.5 mil-
lion tonnes), and the previously agreed capacity of 30 million tonnes will not be achieved 
until 2019.
34 According to Gazprom’s announcement, 500 km of the gas pipeline has already been 
constructed since the beginning of February 2017. “Газпром” построил 500 км “Силы 
Сибири”, http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/81989 
35 «Газпром» получит 2 млрд евро кредита у Bank of China, http://www.vedomosti.ru/
business/articles/2016/03/04/632474-gazprom-kredita-china 
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This concerns both the Baikal region (there is a plan to build a branch of Power 
of Siberia-1, running from Blagoveshchensk to Chita) and Khabarovsk and Pri-
morsky Krais. However, it is unclear whether these plans will ever be put into 
practice. Forecasts concerning gas consumption in the Far East and Baikal re-
gion differ significantly. According to the findings of experts from the magazine 
Neftegazovaya Vertikal, gas consumption in the macroregion in 2020 may reach 
anywhere between 5 and 38 billion m3 36. 
An	important	project	which	has	been	carried	out	is	the	gas	liquefaction	
plant	in	Sakhalin	Oblast. The gas liquefaction plant launched in 2009 is cur-
rently the only LNG export terminal operating in Russia. The total production 
capacity of its two branches stands at 10 million tonnes (around 14.5 billion m3 
of gas). The largest importers of Russian liquefied natural gas are Japan (almost 
70% of exports) and South Korea (around 17%). The remaining part is supplied 
to China, Taiwan and Thailand (a detailed specification is provided in Table 9.
Table 9. Russian LNG exports (in millions of tonnes)
Importer country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Japan 2.84 6.29 7.18 8.31 8.73 8.32 7.78 7.38
south Korea 1.02 3.39 2.82 2.17 1.96 2 2.69 1.92
Kuwait 0.31 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0
china 0.19 0.38 0.24 0.38 0 0.13 0.19 0.26
Taiwan 0.12 0.51 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.26 1.29
Thailand 0 0 0.06 0 0 0.06 0 0
India 0.51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4.99 10.64 10.48 10.92 10.75 10.57 10.92 10.85
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data published annually in the World LNG Report. 
Russian firms are planning to build more LNG terminals: Gazprom intends to 
build a new LNG terminal in Vladivostok (total production capacity of 10 million 
tonnes). In turn, Rosneft plans to build its own terminal as part of the Sakhalin-1 
36 Нефтегазовая вертикаль, 2014, № 13–14, page 52. 
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project (one branch with a production capacity of 5 million tonnes). The difficult 
financial situation of Russian firms resulting on the one hand from low global oil 
prices and on the other from the financial and technological sanctions imposed 
on Russia (due to aggression against Ukraine in 2014) may, however, thwart 
these plans in the medium term. 
2. Transport
The second most promising area (after the energy sector) is the transport sector. 
Its development and modernisation is one of the key elements in maintaining 
links with the centre of the federation. Besides, the Far East plays an important 
role in international transport, especially to such countries as Australia, China, 
North and South Korea and Japan. 
However, the problem is that the transport infrastructure is developed une-
qually in the Russian Far East. The southern regions and Sakhalin Island have 
quite well-developed road networks. In contrast, the northern regions practi-
cally have no connection with the southern areas and the centre of Russia alike. 
For this reason, transport network development has become not only a stated 
goal but also a real priority for the central government, which is interested in 
intensifying imports of raw materials and goods to Asian and European coun-
tries as well as profiting from the transit of cargo from Asia to Europe. 
Another challenge the government needs to face is the fact that the	transport 
system	in	the	Far	East	is	not	logistically	integrated	(warehouses, sorting 
centres, transhipment and customs points, etc.). There are many logistic prob-
lems with transport hubs, especially those connecting railroads with seaports, 
and the disparities in their technological equipment are a barrier to increasing 
the volume of transhipment and the development of international transport. 
Rail transport and the Far Eastern ports currently occupy a key role; yet the 
role of road and air transport is also growing steadily. 
2.1. Railroad transport
The Far East’s rail	transport	is based on two main lines: the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (Transsib) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM). Transsib is a railway 
line almost 9,300 km-long, connecting Moscow and Vladivostok (the route runs 
through such cities as Perm, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Chita, Biro-
bidzhan and Khabarovsk). In turn, BAM is a railway line around 4,300 km-long 
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connecting Tayshet, a town in Eastern Siberia, and the Far Eastern port of 
Vanino and – taking into account the ferry connection – Sovetskaya Gavan in 
Sakhalin (the precise route of the two railway lines is presented in a map – see 
Appendix). However, both the present transport capacity and the technical con-
dition of the two railroads prevent the development of bulk cargo (oil, petroleum 
products, construction materials, timber) and general cargo37. 
Chukotka Autonomous Oblast, Kamchatka Krai and Magadan Oblast have no 
access to railroads at all. The total length of the region’s rail network is only 14% 
that of the Russian rail network as a whole, and its density per 10,000 km2 is 
3.6 times smaller than the general Russian average. 
2.2. Maritime transport
Maritime	transport	plays a major role in the Russian Far East’s economy. 
28 sea and fishing ports operate along the 5,600 mile-long coastline, handling 
17% of the cargo of all Russian seaports and 95% of the cargo in the Far East. 
The transhipment volume in the Far Eastern ports in 2015 reached 171 million 
tonnes, which meant a 8.5 million-ton growth as compared to 201438. The Far 
Eastern seaports are used above all to export Russian coal, timber, oil, petro-
leum products and ores. The predominant imports are grain, sugar, metals, ce-
ment, chemical products, machines and equipment. The Far Eastern ports play 
an especially important role in cabotage transport, mainly from Primorsky Krai 
to the northern ports of Kamchatka Krai, Magadan Oblast and Sakhalin Oblast, 
for which this is the only way to receive cargo. The Far East’s largest ports are: 
Vostochny (transhipment of 57 million tonnes), Vanino (26 million tonnes), Na-
khodka (21 million tonnes), Vladivostok (15 million tonnes), De-Kastri (8 million 
tonnes) and Posyet (7 million tonnes), which tranship over 83% of the cargo39. 
The ports of Primorsky Krai and Vanino in Khabarovsk Krai are connected with 
Transsib and BAM via which over 90% of the cargo are transported and are the 
most important transport hubs in the region.
37 Изменения, которые вносятся в постановление Правительства Российской Федерации 
от 15 апреля 1996 г. № 480, Об утверждении федеральной целевой программы «Эко-
номическое и социальное развитие Дальнего Востока и Забайкалья на период до 
2013 года», http://www.open.minvostokrazvitia.ru/interrogations/22/1555/ 
BAM’s present transport capacity is 16 million tonnes of cargo. It is planned to be increased 
to 55 million tonnes in 2020. Transsib’s annual capacity is 100 million tonnes of cargo, while 
the annual demand is at least 120 million tonnes.
38 http://primamedia.ru 
39 85% export cargo and 45% import cargo are handled by the Far Eastern seaports. 
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At the same time, the regularly growing demand for international and cabotage 
transport means that the	Far	Eastern	sea	ports	need	to	be	developed	and	
modernised.	Many of them require increasing capacity (the total transhipment 
volume of the 28 sea ports in the Far Eastern Federal District is six times lower 
than that of Shanghai port). Demand for bulk cargo transhipment is growing, 
especially in the ports handling exports. Due to underinvestment in the ports 
and their transport infrastructure, their transhipment capacity is utilised to 
only 60%40. The situation may be improved by the act of 13 July 2015, establish-
ing the ‘Free Port of Vladivostok’41 where imported goods will be duty and VAT 
free, and where tax rebates will apply for five years.
The	Northern	sea	basin	including the White Sea, the Barents Sea and the seas 
of the Arctic Ocean, being part of the Northern Sea Route, is playing an in-
creasing role in maritime transport. The maritime fleet operating in this region 
ensures supplies to the northernmost territories of the Far East – the Arctic 
islands. The development of the Northern Sea Route’s infrastructure will allow 
a shortening of the route via which goods are transported from China, Japan and 
Korea and also from Northern America to Europe by nearly 4,000 km. 
River	transport	is	of	lesser	significance.	It is based on the two largest routes: 
the Lena and Amur Rivers. Seasonality is the factor that limits its significance 
to the region’s economy; this transport route can be used only for 160–180 days 
a year due to freezing temperatures. Failure to modernise the river fleet and its 
infrastructure and the high costs of transport and reloading of goods represent 
additional limitations. 
2.3. Road transport
The share of truck transport in the transport of goods and passengers is regu-
larly growing. Road transport plays the most important role in interregion-
al and frontier freight. The most important roads are the federal car routes: 
‘Amur’ (Chita–Skovorodino–Birobidzhan–Khabarovsk – 2097 km), ‘Ussuri’ 
(Khabarovsk–Vladivostok – 767 km), ‘Vostok’ (Khabarovsk–Nakhodka – 
824 km), ‘Lena’ (Bolshoy Never–Yakutsk – 1157 km), ‘Kolyma’ (Yakutsk–Magadan 
– 2021 km). The APEC summit held in Vladivostok in 2012 accelerated the de-
velopment and modernisation of the road network and the improvement of its 
40 Порты Дальнего Востока, http://www.realeconomy.ru/221/1480/5419 
41 Федеральный закон от 13 июля 2015 г. N 212-ФЗ “О свободном порте Владивосток”, 
https://rg.ru/2015/07/15/fz212-dok.html 
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infrastructure (for example, some of the checkpoints on the border with China 
were developed and modernised). 119 km of roads were built or reconstructed, 
including the route running from Vladivostok to the international airport and 
the ‘Ussuri’ road from Vladivostok to Nakhodka. Three suspension bridges 
were also built in Vladivostok (the 2.1 km-long bridge over Zolotoy Rog bay; the 
3.1 km-long bridge over the strait called Eastern Bosphorus to Russky Island; 
the 4.3 km-long low-water bridge over the Amur Bay) and roads were built on 
Russky Island where the meetings as part of the APEC summit were held42. 
Although demand is growing, the road infrastructure is still poorly	developed.	
The average road density in the region is only 5.3 km per 1000 km2, while the 
Russian average is 31.7 km per 1000 km2 43. As many as 1400 population centres 
in the region lack any access to road infrastructure. Almost half of the roads 
fail to meet technical standards (such as not being covered with asphalt) and do 
not guarantee safety of the rapidly growing truck transport. On the one hand, 
both extremely difficult climate conditions and the low population level lie be-
hind the paucity of roads, especially in northern territories. On the other hand, 
infrastructure modernisation poses a serious challenge, given the intensifying 
competition from Chinese carriers (three roads and three railroads run through 
the 4,200 km-long border)44. 
2.4. Air transport 
Air	transport	plays a major role in transporting passengers and goods both 
inside the macroregion and to/from the central regions of Russia. It is often 
the only means of transport, enabling connections with the difficult to access 
northern territories. It also enables landing on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. 
107 civilian airports are currently present in the Russian Far East, yet only 
52 of them have runways meeting international standards and the remain-
ing have only dirt runways at their disposal45. Only 67% of the airports have 
42 Транспорт России, № 10(817), 6 March 2014.
43 https://rg.ru/2010/10/18/set.html 
44 At present, goods are transported under a bilateral agreement setting the number of annu-
ally issued transport licences. Their number is increasing every year. In 2013, Russian car-
riers received 61,260 licences, and Chinese carriers received 60,450 licences. The Chinese 
party, fearing competition from Russian carriers, allows Russian trucks to enter China 
only from Russia, not allowing transit from third countries, e.g. Kazakhstan. 
45 Data provided by the website Транспорт России, http://www.transportrussia.ru 
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adequate infrastructure facilitating flight handling, including lights46. Most 
airports need to be developed, modernised and adjusted to the applicable tech-
nical standards. The state of the airports is one of the factors which discourages 
potential investors from engagement in the region. 
46 The number of passengers at the Far East’s largest airport in Khabarovsk is 27 times smaller 
than at Singapore Airport (1.9 million as compared to 51 million of passengers in 2012). 
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III. The maIn BarrIers To The developmenT 
of The russIan far easT
The government’s activity in the Russian Far East, most visible in the strate-
gic energy and transport sectors, has changed Moscow’s ambivalent attitude 
towards the region as seen in the 1990s. Nevertheless, although the region has 
gained significance on the list of the federal priorities, it does not allow the 
centre of the federation to fulfil its assumed political goals. Moscow has been 
unable as yet to generate tangible development activity in the region. As a result, 
the Far East has not become yet an important instrument for strengthening 
Moscow’s economic influence in Eastern Asia. The expectations of intensify-
ing cross-border economic co-operation in the Russian Far East and attracting 
major foreign investments to the regions remain unrealised. 
The causes of this predicament are above all internal and in some respects are 
linked to the systemic problems existing across Russia, while in other respects 
are of a specifically local nature. 
1. The lack of a consistent development concept and the ineffective 
governance system
One	of	the	major	barriers	halting	development	is	the	lack	of	a	consistent	
concept	for	economic	development	of	the	Russian	state.	The	consequences	
of	this	include	the	lack	of	well-thought-out	regional	strategies,	including	
those	concerning	the	Far	East. Proof of this includes both the multitude of 
programme documents adopted at the federal level (strategies, concepts and 
programmes) and the inconsistency in the implementation thereof. Most stra-
tegic decisions concerning the Russian economy are strictly subordinate to deci-
sions of a purely political nature as regards both domestic and political issues. 
The best example illustrating this is in the consequences of Russia’s aggressive 
policy towards Ukraine, resulting in sectoral sanctions imposed by the West 
on Moscow and corresponding Russian counter-sanctions. Their adverse effect 
on trade has also been visible in the case of the Far East; the value of imports to 
the Far Eastern Federal District was nearly halved – it fell from US$10.5 billion 
in 2014 to US$5.7 billion in 2015 (US$5.8 billion in 2016). 
Another example of the lack of consistency on the level of stated versus actually 
conducted economic policy of the state is the postulate that it is necessary to di-
versify the Russian economy and reduce its reliance on the fuel and energy sector. 
This does not correspond to the actual measures taken, either at the federal or 
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regional levels. The budget incomes are still based predominantly on the revenues 
from the fuel and energy sector; on the other hand, the state treats investments in 
the energy sector as a priority. One example of this is the expensive gas pipeline 
projects implemented in Europe (Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream) and Asia 
(Power of Siberia-1). Another example of the inconsistent approach is provided 
by tariff policy. The high tariffs (on transport, energy and other) have led to the 
share of transport costs in the value of oil and gas transported reaching 50%; the 
share of transport costs is also high in the case of metallurgical products. 
The	increasingly	ineffective	governance	system	on	both	the	federal	and	re-
gional	level	is	another	major	barrier.	On the one hand, the decision-making 
process has been centralised during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. On the 
other hand, numerous structures have been created in the case of the policy 
adopted towards the Far East, without clearly distributing the competences. 
For example, the entities tasked with planning and implementation of projects 
concerning the Far East in 2012–2014 were: the Ministry for the Development 
of the Russian Far East, the special plenipotentiary envoy of the president of 
the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District, the Ministry of Re-
gional Development of the Russian Federation (shut down in September 2014) 
and a number of smaller agencies and funds. 
The system for redistributing the funds earned by the economically strategic 
sectors is also ineffective and unrewarding from the regional perspective. Un-
processed raw materials are exported directly from the mining site to recipients 
in Asian countries. The resulting funds received accrue mainly to the centre 
of the federation, while only a small portion of them remains in the region. 
Consequently, the regions which are suppliers of raw materials have to rely on 
subsidies from the federal budget. 
The ineffective governance system also adversely affects projects of strategic 
significance. One example is the construction of the Vostochny spaceport in 
Amur Oblast, which, according to President Putin’s order, was to be put into 
operation towards the end of 2015. This investment is of strategic significance 
for Russia because it would mean that Russia is no longer dependent on the Bai-
konur spaceport in Kazakhstan. As revealed by an audit, the cost estimates of 
the work have been inflated and some of the funds have been misappropriated. 
It has been impossible to supply part of the equipment ordered under contracts 
due to Western sanctions. Furthermore, construction work has also been de-
layed due to financial problems affecting many subcontractors, caused by dif-
ficulty in obtaining funding and high loan costs. 
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2. staffing problems in the russian far east 
The	small	number	of	inhabitants,	which	has	been	declining	for	many	
years,	represents	one	of	the	most	serious	barriers	to	the	development	
of	the	Far	East.	Its residents, especially young and educated ones, leave the 
macroregion for the central regions of Russia in search of better living and 
work conditions. The main reasons for the continuing migration of its citizens 
for many years have been the loss of many jobs following the collapse of the 
USSR and the closure of numerous production facilities. Other factors encour-
aging migration are: harsh climate conditions, higher living costs compared 
to other regions and underfunded healthcare, education and social welfare 
system. Between 1990 and 2010, one in five residents of the Far East left the 
region, most of them being young people of productive ages. The largest mi-
gration wave (42%) has affected the northern regions of the Far East (69% 
of residents have left Chukotka Autonomous Oblast and 55% have emigrated 
from Magadan Oblast)47. The low birth rate and the high mortality rate (higher 
than Russian average) are further contributors to the difficult demographic 
situation in the macroregion48. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that the downward demographic trend has 
abated over the past few years. The population in the Far East declined on aver-
age by 0.2–0.4% in 2011–2015. One positive factor is that the number of births 
exceeds the number of deaths: by 7,400 people in 2013, by 9,300 people in 2014, 
by 8,100 people in 2015 and by 5,077 in 2016. The population growth rate has 
increased over the past decade from 11.6 per I thousand in 2005 to 14.0 per thou-
sand in 2014 (13.9 per thousand in 2015 and 13.3 per thousand in 2016). 
On the one hand, an upward trend has been observed in the migration balance, 
indicating that the number of residents emigrating from the region has been 
steadily falling (detailed data are provided in Table 10). On the other hand, peo-
ple with low levels of qualifications predominate among the immigrants, and 
this does not help address the region’s acute staffing problems. 
47 А. В. Хорошавин, В. К. Заусаев, op. cit., page 218. 
48 In 2011, average life expectancy in the region was 66.4 years (61.6 years in Chukotka Au-
tonomous Oblast and 67.7 years in Yakutia), the Russian average being 69.8 years.
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The so-called ‘Far Eastern hectare’ act adopted in 2016 is also expected to help 
improve the demographic situation49. It permits citizens of the Russian Federa-
tion50 to acquire free of charge one hectare of state-owned land located in the 
Far Eastern Federal District. 
The effects of the act have hitherto been very limited (as of February 2017). 
Around 40,000 applications were received between 1 June 2016 and 1 February 
2017. Only 4,000 of these applications were granted. In turn, since 1 Febru-
ary 2017, when all citizens of the Russian Federation, not just residents of the 
Far Eastern Federal District, were vested with the right to apply for the land, 
only 2,500 applications have been submitted. State resources in the district are 
around 614 million ha of land, almost 90% of which is unused51. 
Table 10. Migrations of people in the Far Eastern Federal District (number of people) 
Immigrants emigrants Balance
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Yakutia 31 486 36 456 36 715 38 194 41 843 40 868 - 6 708 - 5 387 -4 153
Kamchatka 
Krai
13 246 13 441 12 561 16 368 14 755 14 366 -3 122 -1 314 -1 805
Primorsky 
Krai
75 467 77 358 77 058 79 415 80 149 80 267 -3 948 -2 791 -3 209
Khabarovsk 
Krai
55 847 54 521 57 047 58 382 59 448 58 633 -2 535 -4 927 -1 586
Amur Oblast 29 939 29 566 28 761 31 204 33 181 32 031 -1 265 - 3 675 -3 270
49 Федеральный закон от 1 мая 2016 г. N119-ФЗ „Об особенностях предоставления граж-
данам земельных участков, находящихся в государственной или муниципальной 
собственности и расположенных на территориях субъектов Российской Федерации, 
входящих в состав Дальневосточного федерального округа, и о внесении изменений 
в от де льные законодательные акты Российской Федерации”, http://dvgektar.ru/
threads /tekst-zakona-o-dalnevostochnom-gektare.2/ 
50 From 1 June 2016 this right was vested only in residents of selected parts of all administra-
tive subjects located within the Far Eastern Federal District; from 1 October 2016 in all citi-
zens of the Russian Federation living in the district, and since 1 February 2017 in all citizens 
of the Russian Federation, regardless of their place of residence. 
51 Гектар на всю страну, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3207549; Дальневосточный гек-
тар, https://rg.ru/2016/06/02/vyzhutovich-poluchateliam-besplatnogo-gektara-budut-nu-
zhny-deshevye-kredity.html 
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Immigrants emigrants Balance
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Magadan 
Oblast
5 721 5 882 7 883 7 998 7 613 8 622 -2 277 -1 731 -739
Sakhalin 
Oblast
20 167 21 321 21 971 23 078 22 615 22 458 -2 911 -1 294 -487
Jewish 
Autonomous
Oblast
4 175 4 660 4 754 6 007 6 674 6 356 -1 832 -2 014 -1 603
Chukotka 
Autonomous
Oblast
4 814 4 392 4 280 4 968 4 981 4 796 -154 - 589 -516
far eastern 
federal
district
240 862 247 597 251 030 265 614 271 259 268 397 -24 752 - 23 662 -17 367
Source: Экономическая коньюнктура в Дальневосточном федеральном округе в 2015 г., Про­
странственная экономика, № 3, 2016, page 145; Экономическая коньюнктура в Дальневосточном 
федеральном округе в 2016 г., Пространственная экономика, № 2, 2017, page 160. 
The	immigrant	issue,	and	especially	the	concerns	present	in	Russian	pub-
lic	discourse	linked	to	the	massive	influx	of	Chinese	to	the	Russian	Far	
East,	is	a	separate	problem.	Even though serious discrepancies currently exist 
between official and unofficial data52, it seems that the perception of a radical 
increase in immigration from China (including expatriate workers) is at present 
more a myth than a genuine threat. On the one hand, the three northern prov-
inces of China bordering the Russian Far East currently have a population of 
around 100 million, which is viewed as a concern by Moscow, when contrasted 
with the number of residents of the Far Eastern Federal District (6.3 million 
people). On the other hand, according to official data collected during the 2010 
census in the Far Eastern Federal District, around 8,800 Chinese lived on a per-
manent basis there, accounting for less than 0.14% of the district’s population 
and around 30% of the total number of Chinese residents of Russia53. According 
to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, around 239,500 Chinese currently 
52 One example was the statement made by the Minister for Ethnic Policy of the Russian Fed-
eration in 2002 that, while the official number of Chinese residents of Russia did not exceed 
400,000, according to unofficial estimates, their number might reach even 4 million. 
53 Население по национальности и владению русским языком по субъектам Российс-
кой Федерации, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol4/
pub-04-04.pdf 
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live in the Russian Federation (as of 5 April 2016), i.e. around 2.4% of the total 
number of foreigners54; according to unofficial data, not more than 500,000 
people55. In turn, according to experts’ estimates, the Chinese population in the 
Russian Far East may range between 70,000 and 200,000 people (i.e. between 
1% and 3% of the total number of residents of the Far Eastern Federal District56). 
Citizens of post-Soviet countries, especially Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan and to a lesser extent of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, form an 
increasing group among the immigrants in the Russian Far East57.
There	are	several	reasons	behind	the	relatively	low	scale	of	migration	
among	the	Chinese	population	(predominantly	a	less	qualified	workforce	
and	small	entrepreneurs)	to	the	Russian	Far	East.	Firstly, the living stand-
ards and work conditions in the region (in particular, wages) are not really 
appealing from the point of view of Chinese emigrants, apart from the energy 
sector, which generates to a limited extent a demand for workers (usually sea-
sonal or linked with the implementation of specific projects58). In turn, other 
branches, especially agriculture, are still very poorly developed. Aside from 
this, central regions of Russia are the ultimate migration destination for many 
Chinese who cross the Russian-Chinese border in the Far East. Secondly, an-
other important factor is that the economic development rate is much higher 
and the unemployment level is relatively low in the north-eastern provinces of 
China in comparison to the Russian Far East. For example, the unemployment 
rate is only 4.5% and the GDP growth rate reached 5.7% in 2015 in the Chinese 
province Heilongjiang (for comparison, GDP in the Far Eastern Federal District 
fell by 3.7% in 2015). Thirdly, administrative barriers posed by Russian law based 
on bureaucratised and complicated procedures for border crossing and legalisa-
tion of stay do matter to a certain extent. Moreover, the Russian government has 
54 Т. Н. Журавская, Миграция из стран СНГ в Амурскую область в контексте сите-
тической теории, Пространственная экономика, № 3, pages 105-106. 
55 Страшная сказка. Стоит ли бояться захвата Сибири китайцами, https://lenta.ru/ar-
ticles/2015/11/24/mythsaboutchinese/; China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative and the sino-
Russian Entente. An Interview with Alexander Gabuev, http://www.nbr.org/research/ac-
tivity.aspx?id=707 
56 Помогут ли китайские и украинские мигранты поднять Дальний Восток?, http://in-
osmi.ru/economic/20160216/235429994.html 
57 Only around 6.8% of immigrants among the total number of citizens of other countries 
coming to Russia settle in the Russian Far East (for comparison, over 62% of immigrants 
settle in the Central and North-Western Federal Districts); Т. Н. Журавская, op. cit., pages 
105-106.
58 For example, Transneft employs around 1800 Chinese workers as part of the construction 
of the Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline.
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been reducing the quotas of work permits granted to foreigners in Russia; for 
example, in 2017, the limit for the Far Eastern Federal District was reduced by 
11.9% (to 6,430 people)59. Fourthly, most Chinese citizens who decide to emigrate 
from their previous place of residence usually settle in other regions of China, 
especially in the western provinces60. 
Many factors indicate that the situation is not likely to change within the next 
decade. It seems unlikely that the economic attractiveness of the Russian Far 
East will increase. It is also difficult to expect that the attitude of the Russian 
government – both federal and local – will change in such a manner that it would 
regard greater openness to migrants from China more as an opportunity rather 
than as a concern or even threat. The Chinese themselves are also unlikely to 
become more interested. However, the situation might change in the case of 
serious ecological problems appearing in China (in particular, the problem with 
accessibility of water resources or increasing air pollution).
3. The decentralised energy system
Another limitation to the development of the Russian Far East is the decentral-
ised	energy	system, which makes it impossible to send periodical electricity 
surpluses to other regions which lack sufficient energy resources. Most of this 
vast area is covered with local transmission networks (the total length of power 
lines exceeds 105,000 km), and only 25% of the territory is connected to the com-
mon Russian transmission network, the United Energy System of Russia (UES of 
Russia); the energy systems of the Baikal region are part of the common energy 
system of Siberia, which is connected to the UES of Russia61. In turn, the power 
networks of Kamchatka Krai, Magadan Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Oblast, 
Sakhalin Oblast and part of Yakutia are not connected to the common energy 
system. The greatest amount of electricity, generated mainly by hydropower 
plants, is produced in Irkutsk Oblast (44%). The share of the other regions of the 
Far East in electricity production is only 9%. 
59 Дальний Восток примет меньше всего трудовых мигрантов, http://dv.land/news/9854 
60 Перенос страхов: стоит ли опасаться китайских заводов на Дальнем Востоке?, http://
maxpark.com/community/politic/content/5261211; M. Repnikova, H. Balzer, Chinese mi-
gration to Russia: missed opportunities, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
No3_ChineseMigtoRussia.pdf 
61 OEC Vostok (Amur Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Primorsky Krai 
and the southern regions of Yakutia) and OES Sibir are connected with three power lines 
with a capacity of 200 kW supplying electricity to recipients along the Transsib and BAM 
railroads but not ensuring power transmission between OEC Sibir and OEC Vostok.
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Given the vast distances, low population density and the harsh climate, the 
local energy sector will be of key importance in the energy system of the Far 
East. Improving its efficiency is one of the conditions on which potential invest-
ments in the region depend, mainly in raw material production and processing, 
given their cost-efficiency. This would require developing and modernising local 
power networks, which might lead to reducing energy losses in transmission 
networks and the costs of connecting new recipients, using local energy sources 
(including renewable) and employing extra-budgetary funds. 
Relatively high tariffs in the power sector also pose a major problem. Tradition-
ally, the tariffs used to be higher in the Far East as compared to the Russian 
average. Cutting the tariffs for industrial recipients by around 30% in December 
2016 was therefore an essential step aimed at improving the situation (for ex-
ample, the tariff cuts reached 65% in the case of Chukotka Autonomous Oblast, 
50% in the case of Yakutia, 46% in the case of Sakhalin Oblast and 34% in the 
case of Magadan Oblast)62.
4. The limited foreign investments
Foreign	investment	in	the	Russian	Far	East	is	relatively	limited	and	ac-
counts	for	only	20%	of	total	investment	funds.	At the same time, the region’s 
share of the total value of foreign investment in Russia has been falling. In 2011, 
the Far East and Zabaikalsky Region generated around 17% of Russia’s foreign 
investment, in 2012 this share fell to 11.6 % and in 2013 to 9.2%63. 
Sakhalin Oblast has been the key federal subject attracting foreign investment. 
Back in 2005, it accumulated around 96.5% of investment funds. In 2011, its 
share fell to 70%, and in 2013 to 40%. The main reason has been its attractiveness 
to firms interested in the implementation of energy projects. One example is 
Sakhalin–Energy, whose shareholders – in addition to Gazprom (50% plus one 
share) – are Holland’s Royal Dutch Shell (27.5% minus one share) and Japan’s 
Mitsui (12.5% stake) and Mitsubishi (10% stake). The consortium owns a gas 
liquefaction plant (Sakhalin-2 project), exporting annually around 10 million 
tonnes of liquefied natural gas (around 14.5 billion m3). Another example is 
62 Госдума приняла закон о снижении энерготарифов на Дальнем Востоке, http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/3174709 
63 Деловой портрет Дальнего Востока, http://www.eastrussia.ru/material/delovoy-portret 
-dalnego-vostoka/ 
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the Sakhalin-1 project, whose shareholders are Russia’s Rosneft (20% stake), 
US Exxon Mobil (30%), India’s ONGC (20%) and SODECO (30%). 
China	appears	to	be	the	most	promising	foreign	investor	–	regardless	of	
the	concerns	sometimes	formulated	in	the	Russian	public	sphere	and	the	
relatively	small	scale	of	its	engagement	so	far.	According to the most recent 
data provided by Aleksandr Galushka, the Minister for the Development of the 
Far East, China accounts for 160 billion roubles (around US$2.8 billion) out of 
the 1 trillion roubles (around US$17.3 billion) invested in the Territories of Ad-
vanced Development and the Free Port of Vladivostok64.
Beijing is interested in developing transport corridors in which the Russian 
Far East and the Baikal Region will participate. The aforementioned energy 
projects and also the routes used for transporting goods other than oil and gas 
are of key significance. The two branches of Primorye corridors: Primorye-1 
(Harbin–Vladivostok–Nakhodka) and Primorye-2 (Jilin–Zarubino–Slavyanka) 
are especially important to Beijing. China’s genuine interest has been proven by 
the fact that Beijing vested local governments of the Chinese frontier provinces 
with powers to enhance international cross-border co-operation. 
Japan may also potentially become an important partner as regards foreign in-
vestment, although its investment contribution has so far been limited (around 
US$0.44 billion in 2015). The still unresolved territorial dispute over the Kuril 
Islands had been a key barrier for years; however, Moscow managed to convince 
the Japanese to change their approach, separating the territorial disputes from 
economic co-operation65. Tokyo is interested in developing energy co-operation, 
proof of which includes the preliminary agreements signed with Russia, for 
example, one concerning the construction of the third production branch as 
part of the Sakhalin-2 project, as well as agreements between Japanese firms 
and Rosneft on the development and operation of the fields located in the Sea of 
Japan66. Furthermore, talks on building a gas pipeline running from Russia to 
64 Дальний Восток испытал прилив инвесторов, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3080905 
65 For more information on the evolution of political relations between Russia and Japan, see: 
W. Rodkiewicz, The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy, 
OSW Point of View, 6.10.2014, pages 25-27; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-
view/2014-10-06/turn-to-east-flawed-diversification-russian-foreign-policy 
66 In May 2013, Rosneft and Japan’s INPEX signed an agreement on establishing a joint venture 
tasked with operating oil fields on the Sea of Okhotsk; https://rosneft.com/press/releases/
item/185095/ 
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Japan have been underway for many years, which was confirmed on the occa-
sion of President Putin’s visit to Japan on 15–16 December 2016. 
At the same time, many factors preventing the influx of foreign investments 
exist at present. The main barriers stem from the geographical characteristics 
of the region – small population density, still poorly developed infrastructure 
and harsh climatic conditions, which generate additional costs for potential 
investors. Another crucial element is the lower competitiveness of the Russian 
proposition which also concerns those sectors where trade relations were tradi-
tionally intense. For example, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs from Ja-
pan began withdrawing from buying timber and derived products from Russia 
and are instead choosing Canadian manufacturers who offer more competitive 
prices. Political impediments also have a great impact. Since the Russian ag-
gression against Ukraine, investment opportunities have been restricted by the 
sanctions imposed on Russia by the USA, the EU and such countries as Canada 
and Japan. Furthermore, the unresolved Kuril Islands issue – despite the sug-
gestions that the stance has been changed – remains a barrier to qualitatively 
significant investments in the case of Japan. This has been proven by the lim-
ited economic effects of the aforementioned visit to Tokyo by President Putin 
in December 201667. On top of that, the issue of using existing transit routes is 
also essential in the case of Japan; most of its exports are supplied to Russia via 
the Baltic Sea and not through the Far East. This is mainly a result of the fact 
that it is the European part of Russia that is the main outlet for Japanese goods 
(automotive products, machine-building and electronic industries). 
Another limitation preventing the region’s economic development is the small 
internal market which is insufficiently appealing to investors. The vast dis-
tances and high costs of transport to the distant central regions of Russia and 
the shortage of qualified workforce make many investments targeted at the 
internal market unprofitable. Both investment and individual consumers’ de-
mand is predominantly geared towards competitive products from imports, 
especially from China, Japan and South Korea (machines and equipment, cars, 
construction materials, clothes, food and miscellaneous).
67 Fore more information see: W. Rodkiewicz, Russia-Japan: no breakthrough on the Kuril 
Islands, OSW Analyses, 21 December 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2016-12-21/russia-japan-no-breakthrough-kuril-islands 
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conclusIons
Since Vladimir Putin took power, the Far East region has gained political signifi-
cance in the context of the priorities of Russia’s domestic and foreign policies. At 
the same time, the lack of a clear comprehensive development concept means 
that a development model based on raw materials is being implemented in prac-
tice, which fits in with the reality of the state policy at the federal level. One of its 
consequences will certainly be an intensification of trade with foreign partners 
(China, Japan and India) interested in imports of Russian oil and gas. However, 
actual growth may be much lower than forecasted, especially considering the 
existing trends in the Chinese energy sector. The present trade dynamics sug-
gests that cross-border contacts with frontier areas will most likely be strength-
ened at the expense of weakening economic ties with other regions of Russia. 
On the other hand, it is hard to envisage that a model based upon raw materials 
would be capable of ensuring a high growth rate and macroeconomic stabil-
ity over the longer term. It will certainly not contribute to the development of 
research and technology. Although numerous universities and academic insti-
tutes operate in the region, the results of their work have no major impact on 
improving the economic situation there. This is because the state-owned com-
panies active in the region that focus on earning as much as possible from raw 
material production are not interested in the results of such institutions’ work. 
At present, there is no risk of the region’s marginalisation as witnessed in the 
1990s. At the same time, it is increasingly unrealistic that the uncompetitive 
Russian Far East might become an important and effective instrument for 
strengthening Russian economic influence in the Eastern Asia region. At pre-
sent, there are no prerequisites that would allow one to assume that the econo-
my of the Russian Far East could become competitive to the increasingly rapidly 
developing northern provinces of China or South Korea and Japan, either in the 
medium or long term. Therefore, it appears that political reintegration of the 
region with the centre of the federation, and the status of a stable raw mate-
rial base for Asian countries, currently represents the maximum development 
potential of the Russian Far East. 
SzyMON	KARDAś,	
ADDiTiONAL	RESEARCh	By:	EwA	FiSChER
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APPendIX 
Map 1. Economic potential of the Far Eastern Federal District 
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Map 2. Russian Far East – infrastructure and energy resources 
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